Abstract. The stream cipher Salsa20 was introduced by Bernstein in 2005 as a candidate in the eSTREAM project, accompanied by the reduced versions Salsa20/8 and Salsa20/12. ChaCha is a variant of Salsa20 aiming at bringing better diffusion for similar performance. Variants of Salsa20 with up to 7 rounds (instead of 20) have been broken by differential cryptanalysis, while ChaCha has not been analyzed yet. In this paper, we introduce a novel method for differential cryptanalysis of Salsa20 and ChaCha, inspired by correlation attacks and related to the notion of neutral bits. This is the first application of neutral bits in stream cipher cryptanalysis, and it allows us to present the first break of Salsa20/8, to bring faster attacks on the 7-round variant, and to break 6-and 7-round ChaCha. In a second part, we analyze the compression function Rumba, constructed as the XOR of four Salsa20 instances, and returning a 512-bit output. We find collision and preimage attacks for two simplified variants, then we discuss differential attacks on the original version, and exploit a high-probability differential to reduce complexity of collision search from 2 256 to 2 79 for 3-round Rumba. We give examples of collisions over three rounds for a version without feedforward, and near-collisions of weight 16 for three rounds of the original compression function, and of weight 129 for four rounds.
Introduction
Salsa20 [4] is a stream cipher introduced by Bernstein in 2005 as a candidate in the eSTREAM project [10] , that has been selected in April 2007 for the third and ultimate phase of the competition. Three independent cryptanalyses were published [9, 11, 14] , reporting key-recovery attacks for reduced versions with up to 7 rounds, while Salsa20 has a total of 20 rounds. Bernstein also submitted to public evaluation the 8-and 12-round variants Salsa20/8 and Salsa20/12 [5] , though they are not formal eSTREAM candidates. More recently, he proposed a change in the core function aiming at bringing faster diffusion without slowing down encryption, calling the variant ChaCha [3] . The compression function Rumba [6] was presented in 2007 in the context of a study of generalized birthday attacks [15] applied to incremental hashing [2] , as the component of a hypothetical iterated hashing scheme. Rumba maps a 1536-bit value to a 512-bit (intermediate) digest, and Bernstein only conjectures collision resistance for this function, letting a further convenient operating mode provide extra security properties as pseudo-randomness.
Related Work. Variants of Salsa20 up to 7 rounds have been broken by differential cryptanalysis, exploiting a truncated differential over 3 or 4 rounds. The knowledge of less than 256 key bits can be sufficient for observing a difference in the state after three or four rounds, given a block of keystream of up to seven rounds of Salsa20. In 2005, Crowley [9] reported a 3-round differential, and built upon this an attack on Salsa20/5 within claimed 2 165 trials. In 2006, Fischer et al. [11] exploited a 4-round differential to attack Salsa20/6 within claimed 2 177 trials. In 2007, Tsunoo et al. [14] attacked Salsa20/7 within about 2 190 trials, still exploiting a 4-round differential, and also claimed a break of Salsa20/8. However, the latter attack is effectively slower than brute force, cf. §3.5. Tsunoo et al. notably improve from previous attacks by reducing the guesses to certain bits-rather than guessing whole key words-using nonlinear approximation of integer addition. Eventually, no attack on ChaCha or Rumba has been published so far.
Contribution. We introduce a novel method for attacking Salsa20 and ChaCha (and potentially other ciphers) inspired from correlation attacks, and from the notion of neutral bit, introduced by Biham and Chen [7] for attacking SHA-0. More precisely, we use an empirical measure of the correlation between certain key bits of the state and the bias observed after working a few rounds backward, in order to split key bits into two subsets: the bits identified by repeated observations of the output-difference, and the bits ultimately determined by exhaustive search. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that neutral bits are used for the analysis of stream ciphers. Our results are summarized in Tab. 1. We present the first key-recovery attack for Salsa20/8, and improve the previous attack on 7-round Salsa20 by a factor 2 37 . In a second part, we first show collision and preimage attacks for simplified versions of Rumba, then we present a differential analysis of the original version using the methods of linearization and neutral bits: our main result is a collision attack for 3-round Rumba running in about 2 79 trials (compared to 2 256 with a birthday attack). We also give examples of near-collisions over three and four rounds. Road Map. We first recall the definitions of Salsa20, ChaCha, and Rumba in §2, then §3 describes our attacks on Salsa20 and ChaCha, and §4 presents our cryptanalysis of Rumba. The appendices give the sets of constant values, and some parameters necessary to reproduce our attacks.
Specification of Primitives
In this section, we give a concise description of the stream ciphers Salsa20 and ChaCha, and of the compression function Rumba.
Salsa20
The stream cipher Salsa20 operates on 32-bit words, takes as input a 256-bit key k = (k 0 , k 1 , . . . , k 7 ) and a 64-bit nonce v = (v 0 , v 1 ), and produces a sequence of 512-bit keystream blocks. The i-th block is the output of the Salsa20 function, that takes as input the key, the nonce, and a 64-bit counter t = (t 0 , t 1 ) corresponding to the integer i. This function acts on the 4 × 4 matrix of 32-bit words written as
The c i 's are predefined constants (see Appendix A). A keystream block Z is then defined as
where "+" symbolizes wordwise integer addition, and where X r = Round r (X) with the round function Round of Salsa20, defined as follows: it first rotates the j-th column of its input X of j positions up, j = 0, . . . , 3, then it transforms each column (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , x 3 )
† to (z 0 , z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) † by sequentially computing
and finally Round rotates the j-th column of j positions down, and transposes the matrix. However, for an odd number of rounds, the last transpose of the last round is omitted 4 ; hence, the r-round inverse X −r = Round −r (X) is defined differently whether it inverts after an odd or and even number of rounds. We write Salsa20/R for R-round variants, i.e. with Z = X + X R .
ChaCha
ChaCha [3] is similar to Salsa20 except that the column-transform operation of Round is the sequence
where the b i 's are temporary variables. Like for Salsa20, the round function of ChaCha is trivially invertible. R-round variants are denoted ChaChaR. The core function of ChaCha suggests that "the big advantage of ChaCha over Salsa20 is the diffusion, which at least at first glance looks considerably faster" [3] .
Rumba
Rumba is a compression function built on Salsa20, mapping a 1536-bit message to a 512-bit value. The input M is parsed as four 384-bit chunks M 0 ,. . . ,M 3 , and Rumba's output is
where each F i is an instance of the function Salsa20 with distinct diagonal constants (see Appendix A), and the remaining 384 bits contain the message. Note that the functions F i include the feedforward operation of Salsa20. A single word j of X i is denoted x i,j . RumbaR stands for R-round variant.
Differential Analysis of Salsa20 and ChaCha
This section introduces differential attacks based on a new technique called probabilistic neutral bits (shortcut PNB's). To apply it to Salsa20 and ChaCha, we first identify optimal choices of truncated differentials, then we describe a general framework for probabilistic backwards computation, and introduce the notion of PNB's along with a method to find them. Then, we outline the overall attack, and present concrete attacks for Salsa20/7, Salsa20/8, ChaCha6, and ChaCha7. Eventually, we discuss our attack scenarios and possibilities of improvements.
Choosing a Differential
Let x i be the i-th word of the matrix-state X, and x i an associated word with the difference 
where the probability holds over all inputs (i.e. keys, nonces and counters). Furthermore, we write ε d the median value over all keys of the random variable
Hence, for half of the keys this differential will have a bias of at least ε d . Note that our statistical model considers a (uniformly) random value of the counter. In the following, we use the shortcuts ID and OD for input-and output-difference.
Probabilistic Backwards Computation
In the following, assume that the differential ([∆ 
with a suitable function of additional bias ε a . One method of approximation is to fix the remaining n key bits (e.g. by zero) and invert R − r rounds. The bias ε a of the approximation then depends on n and on the positions of the unknown bits. More formally, letX correspond to the input X with m key bits replaced by fixed bits. We can then define the function
, and the function g(Z, Z ,X) which constitutes an approximation of f (X), by returning the differential after computing R − r rounds backwards under some noise of bias ε a :
Note that Z, Z , andX only depend on X. The overall bias ε of g is defined by the following equation:
Under some reasonable independency assumptions, the equality ε = ε d ·ε a holds. Again, we denote ε the median bias over all keys. Note that deterministic backwards computation is a special case with ε a = ε.
Probabilistic Neutral Bits
The goal of this section is to identify a (large) subset of key bits which can be replaced by fixed bits, such that the bias ε a of the approximation (and hence ε) is significant. We use a technique related to neutral bits [7] : For a specific differential and a pair of inputs that conforms to this differential, bit number i of the input is called a neutral bit if the pair obtained by complementing the i-th bits of the original pair also conforms to this differential. In our attacks, we identify bits in the key (specific to the differential considered) which are neutral for a subset of inputs (where the inputs are the key, the nonce and the counter). We call them probabilistic neutral bits (PNB's), because flipping a PNB in a conforming pair leads to another conforming pair with a certain probability. To find a set of PNB's, we empirically estimate the influence of each bit of the key on a particular differential. Our experiments follow the algorithm below:
1. Pick a random input X (with fixed constants) and apply the ID to get
r−R and (Z − X ) r−R and observe the OD. 4. Flip the i-th key bit in X and X .
Compute (Z − X)
r−R and (Z − X ) r−R and observe the OD.
By repeating this many times, we can estimate the probability that flipping the i-th key bit does not change the OD after r rounds. We denote this probability Pr = 1 2 (1 + γ i ) and call γ i the neutrality measure of this bit. Singular cases are -γ i = 1: Backwards computation does not depend on key bit i (i.e. it is a neutral bit).
it is a significant bit).
Backwards computation linearly depends on key bit i (i.e. it is a neutral bit for the flipped differential).
We will only consider the key bits with positive neutrality measure-bits with negative neutrality measure would be as useful, by considering the flipped differential observed, but we will observe much more bits with γ i > 0. Generally, the more key bits with high neutrality measure we get, the faster will be the attack, provided that the median bias ε remains non-negligible. In practice, we set a threshold γ and fix all key bits with γ i > γ. Note that, contrary to the (input-specific) neutral bits of [7] , we can here directly combine several PNB's without altering their probabilistic quality.
Remark 1. Tsunoo et al. [14] used nonlinear approximations of integer addition to identify the dependency of key bits, whereas the independent key bits-with respect to nonlinear approximation of some order-are fixed. This can be seen as a special case of our method.
Complexity Estimation
Here we sketch the full attack described in the previous subsections, then study its computational cost. The attack is split up into a precomputation stage, and a stage of effective attack; note that precomputation is not specific to a key or a counter. Precomputation 1. Find a high-probability differential with ID in the nonce. 2. Identify a subset of n key bits which are PNB's for this differential. 3. Determine the bias of the differential with respect to this subset of PNB's, when observed after working R−r rounds backward from a pair of keystream blocks, a correct key portion, and randomly chosen values for the remaining key bits (the PNB's).
Effective attack 4. Collect N pairs of keystream blocks, where each pair is produced by states with random nonce, random counter and relevant ID. 5. For each choice of the m = 256 − n remaining key bits (the subkey), use the N keystream blocks to filter the candidate keys with respect to an optimal distinguisher. 6. For each filtered keys, check correctness by performing exhaustive search over the n remaining bits.
At step 1, we require the difference to be in the nonce because it is the only value which can be controlled by the attacker (a difference in the key would constitute a related-key attack, but this seems unrealistic). Previous attacks on Salsa20 use the rough estimate of N = ε −2 samples for each subkey, in order to identify the correct one in a large search space. But this estimate is incorrect: this is the number of samples necessary to identify a single random bitstream either uniform or with bias ε, which is a different problem of hypothesis testing. In our case, we have a set of 2 m sequences of random variables with 2 m − 1 of them verifying the null hypothesis H 0 , and a single one verifying the alternative hypothesis H 1 . For a realization a of the corresponding random variable A, the decision rule D(a) = i to accept H i can lead to two types of errors:
1. Non-detection: D(a) = 0 and A ∈ H 1 . The probability of this event is p nd . 2. False alarm: D(a) = 1 and A ∈ H 0 . The probability of this event is p fa .
The Neyman-Pearson decision theory gives results to estimate the number of samples N required to get some bounds on the probabilities. Calculus details can be found in [13] , see also [1] for more general results on distributions' distinguishability. For p nd = 1.3 × 10 −3 and p fa = 2 −α , it is
Let us now discuss the complexity of our attack: The cost of precomputation is negligible compared to the effective attack. In the effective attack, steps 4 and 5 have a complexity of 2 m N (ignoring p nd ), to find a number of 2 m p fa subkey candidates.
Step 5 has then a complexity of 2 n 2 m p fa = 2 256−α , as each subkey candidate is checked for correctness together with the remaining n bits. In practice, α should be chosen such that it minimizes 2 m N + 2 256−α . Note that the potential improvement from key ranking techniques is not considered here, see e.g. [12] . The data complexity of our attack is N , i.e. the number of keystream blocks required to test a guess. In practice, we can choose N random nonces, and collect the first keystream block produced with each of those nonces, and the secret key.
Experimental Results
We present here our attacks on Salsa20/7, Salsa20/8, ChaCha6, and ChaCha7.
Application to Salsa20. We used automatized search to identify differentials such that (1) the ID and OD have weight one, (2) the ID lies in the nonce, (3) the bias of the differential ε d is large, and (4) such that many PNB's exist. In practice, we will select a subset of the differentials with large ε d , then for each of them we estimate the number of PNB's for some threshold γ. It appears that the differential with the largest set of PNB's is not necessarily the one with the largest bias. The neutrality measures γ i are computed with about 2 26 random inputs. The threshold γ is chosen as small as possible, such that the bias ε is significant, in order to minimize the number of bits guessed. Below we only present the configurations leading to the best attacks, and provide the list of PNB's in Appendix B.
Attack on Salsa20/7. We observe a 4-round OD after working three rounds backward from a 7-round keystream block. We consider the 4-round differential ([∆ . If we reduce the threshold for neutrality measures, in order to get more than 30 PNB's, then we observe no bias. This suggests that an erroneous guess of key bits just below the threshold will not show a significant deviation from random. Note that our attack reaches the same success probability and supports an identical degree of parallelism as brute force. The previous attack of Tsunoo et al. claims 2 255 trials with data 2 10 for success probability 44%, but exhaustive search succeeds with probability 50% within the same number of trials, with much less data and no additional computations. Therefore their attack does not constitute a break of Salsa20/8.
Application to ChaCha. ChaCha is expected to have faster diffusion than Salsa20 (cf. §2). Our experiments argue in favor of this conjecture, since we found many biased differentials over 3 rounds, but none over 4 rounds. Such differentials of weight one in both ID and OD can easily be found by automatized search. The list of the PNB's used is given in Appendix B.
Attack on ChaCha6. We observe a 3-round OD after working three rounds backward from a 3-round keystream block. The 3-round differential ([∆ Attack on ChaCha7. We observe a 3-round OD after working four rounds backward from a 7-round keystream block. The 3-round differential ([∆ 
Discussion
Our attack on reduced-round Salsa20 exploits a 4-round differential, to break the 8-round cipher by working four rounds backward. For ChaCha, we use a 3-round differential to break 7 rounds. We made intensive experiments for observing a bias after going five rounds backwards from the guess of a subkey, in order to attack Salsa20/9 or ChaCha8, but without success. Four seems to be the highest number of rounds one can invert from a partial key guess, while still observing a non-negligible bias after inversion, and such that the overall cost improves from exhaustive key search. Can one hope to break further rounds by statistical cryptanalysis? We believe that it would require novel techniques and ideas, rather than the relatively simple XOR difference of 1-bit input and 1-bit output. For example, one might combine several biased OD's to reduce data requirements, but this requires almost equal subsets of guessed bits; according to our experiments, this seems difficult to achieve. We also found some highly biased multibit differentials such as ([∆ ] 31 ) with bias ε d = 0.92 for three rounds of ChaCha. However, exploiting multibit differentials, does not improve efficiency either. Note that an alternative approach to attack Salsa20/7 is to consider a 3-round biased differential, and observe it after going four rounds backward. This is however much more expensive than exploiting directly 4-round differentials. Unlike Salsa20, our exhaustive search showed no bias in 4-round ChaCha, be it with one, two, or three target output bits. This argues in favor of the faster diffusion of ChaCha. But surprisingly, when comparing the attacks on Salsa20/8 and ChaCha7, results suggest that after four rounds backward, key bits are more correlated with the target difference in ChaCha than in Salsa20. Nevertheless, ChaCha looks more trustful on the overall, since we could break up to seven ChaCha rounds against eight for Salsa20.
Analysis of Rumba
This section describes our results for the compression function Rumba. Our goal is to efficiently find colliding pairs for R-round Rumba, i.e. input pairs (M, M ) such that RumbaR(M ) ⊕ RumbaR(M ) = 0. Note that, compared to our attacks on Salsa20 (where a single biased bit could be exploited in an attack), a collision attack targets all 512 bits (or a large subset of them for near-collisions).
Collisions and Preimages in Simplified Versions
We show here the weakness of two simplified versions of Rumba, respectively an iterated version with 2048-bit-input compression function, and the compression function without the final feedforward.
On the Role of Diagonal Constants. Rumba20 is fed with 1536 bits, copied in a 2048-bit state, whose remaining 512 bits are the diagonal constants. It is tempting to see these values as the IV of a derived iterated hash function, and use diagonal values as chaining variables. However, Bernstein implicitly warned against such a construction, when claiming that "Rumba20 will take about twice as many cycles per eliminated byte as Salsa20 takes per encrypted byte" [6] ; indeed, the 1536-bit input should contain both the 512-bit chaining value and the 1024-bit message, and thus for a 1024-bit input the Salsa20 function is called four times (256 bits processed per call), whereas in Salsa20 it is called once for a 512-bit input. In the following, we confirm that diagonal values should not be replaced by the chaining variables, by presenting a method for finding collisions within about 2 128 /6 trials, against 2 256 with a birthday attack. Consider the following algorithm: pick an arbitrary 1536-bit message block M 0 , then compute Rumba(M 0 ) = H 0 H 1 H 2 H 3 , and repeat this until two distinct 128-bit chunks H i and H j are equal-say H 0 and H 1 , corresponding to the diagonal constants of F 0 and F 1 in the next round; hence, these functions will be identical in the next round. A collision can then be obtained by choosing two distinct message blocks
What is the cost of our algorithm? By the birthday paradox, the amount of trials for finding a suitable M 0 is about 2 128 /6 (where 6 is the number of distinct pairs), while the construction of M 1 and (M ) 1 is straightforward. Regarding the price-performance ratio, we do not have to store or sort a table, so the price is 2 128 /6-and this, for any potential filter function-while performance is much larger than one, because there are many collisions (one can choose 3 messages and 1 difference of 348 bits arbitrarily). This contrasts with the cost of 2 256 for a serial attack on a 512-bit digest hash function.
On the Importance of Feedforward. In Davies-Meyer-based hash functions like MD5 or SHA-1, the final feedforward is an obvious requirement for onewayness. In Rumba the feedforward is applied in each F i , before a XOR of the four branches, and omitting this operation does not trivially lead to an inversion of the function, because of the incremental construction. However, as we will demonstrate, preimage resistance is not guaranteed with this setting. Let
i , i = 0, . . . , 3 and assume that we are given a 512-bit value H, and our goal is to find M = (M 0 , M 1 , M 2 , M 3 ) such that Rumba(M ) = H. This can be achieved by choosing random blocks M 0 , M 1 , M 2 , and set
We can find then the 512-bit state X with respect to Rumba's definition. This randomized algorithm succeeds with probability 2 −128 , since there are 128 constant bits in an initial state. Therefore, a preimage of an arbitrary digest can be found within about 2 128 trials, against 2 512/3 with the generalized birthday method.
The Birthday Attack
One can observe that the constants of F 0 and F 2 are almost similar, as well as the constants of F 1 and F 3 (cf. Appendix A). To improve the generalized birthday attack suggested in [6] , a strategy is to find a pair (M 0 , M 2 ) such that
is biased in any c bits after R rounds (where c ≈ 114, see [6] ), along with a second pair (M 1 , M 3 ) with
can be seen as the feedforward OD of two states having an ID which is nonzero in some diagonal words. However, differences in the diagonal words result in a large diffusion, and this approach seems to be much less efficient than differential attacks for only one function F i .
Differential Attack
To obtain a collision for RumbaR, it is sufficient to find two messages M and M such that
The freedom in choosing M 1 and M 3 trivially allows to derive many other collisions (multicollision). We use the following notations for differentials: Let the initial states X i and X i have the ID ∆ 0 i = X i ⊕ X i for i = 0, . . . , 3. After r rounds, the observed difference is denoted
r , and the OD (without feedforward) becomes
If feedforward is included in the OD, we use the notation
. With this notation, Eq. 11 becomes ∇ R 0 = ∇ R 2 , and if the feedforward operation is ignored in the F i 's, then Eq. 11 simplifies to ∆ R 0 = ∆ R 2 . To find messages satisfying Eq. 11, we use an R-round differential path of high-probability, with intermediate target difference δ r after r rounds, 0 ≤ r ≤ R. Note that the differential is applicable for both F 0 and F 2 , thus we do not have to subscript the target difference. The probability that a random message pair with ID δ 0 conforms to δ r is denoted p r . To satisfy the equation
, it suffices to find message pairs such that the observed differentials equal the target one, that is,
The naive approach is to try about 1/p r random messages each. This complexity can however be lowered down by:
-Finding constraints on the message pair so that it conforms to the difference δ 1 after one round with certainty (this will be achieved by linearization).
-Deriving message pairs conforming to δ r from a single conforming pair (the message-modification technique used will be neutral bits). Finding a High-Probability Differential. We search for a linear differential over several rounds of Rumba, i.e. a differential holding with certainty when additions are replaced by XOR's, see [11] . The differential is independent of the diagonal constants, and it is expected to have high probability for genuine Rumba if the linear differential has low weight. An exhaustive search for suitable ID's is not traceable, so we choose another method: We focus on a single column in X i , and consider the weight of the input (starting with the diagonal element, which must be zero). With a fixed relative position of the non-zero bits in this input, one can obtain an output of low weight after the first linear round of Rumba (i.e. using the linearized Eq. 3). Here is a list of the mappings (showing the weight only) which have at most weight 2 in each word of the input and output: 
The relations above can be used to construct algorithmically a suitable ID with all 4 columns. Consider the following example, where the state after the first round is again a combination of useful rows: (g 1 , g 10 , g 1 , g 11 ) → (g 1 , g 2 , g 4 , g 1 ).
After 2 rounds, the difference has weight 6 (with weight 3 in the diagonal words).
There is a class of ID's with the same structure: (g 1 , g 10 , g 1 , g 11 ), (g 1 , g 11 , g 1 , g 10 ), (g 10 , g 1 , g 11 , g 1 ), (g 11 , g 1 , g 10 , g 1 ). The degree of freedom is large enough to construct these 2-round linear differentials: the positions of the nonzero bits in a single mapping g i are symmetric with respect to rotation of words (and the required g i have an additional degree of freedom). Any other linear differential constructed with g i has larger weight after 2 rounds. Let ∆ i,j denote the difference of word j = 0, . . . , 15 in state i = 0, . . . , 3. For our attacks on Rumba, we will consider the following input difference (with optimal rotation, such that many MSB's are involved):
and ∆ 0 i,j = 0 for all other words j. The weight of differences for the first four linearized rounds is as follows (the subscript of the arrows denotes the approximate probability p r that a random message pair conforms to this differential): −194 . For 3 rounds, we have weights v = 7 and w = 37, thus the overall complexity to find a collision after 3 rounds is about 2 −41−37−7 = 2 85 . For 4 rounds, v = 7 and w = 112, leading to a complexity 2 −313 . The probability that feedforward behaves linearly can be increased by choosing low-weight inputs.
Linearization. The first round of our differential has probability p 1 = 2
for a random message. This is roughly confirmed by our experiments, where exact probabilities depend on the diagonal constants (for example, we observed Pr = 2 −3.6 for F 1 , and Pr = 2 −7.9 for F 3 ). We show here how to set constraints on the message so that the first round differential holds with certainty, using methods similar to the ones in [11] . The first round of F 2 can be linearized with exactly the same conditions. This way, we save an average factor of 2 4 (additive complexities are ignored). This linearization with sufficient conditions does not work well for more than one round because of an avalanche effect of fixed bits. We lose many degrees of freedom, and contradictions are likely to occur.
Neutral Bits. Thanks to linearization, we can find a message pair conforming to δ 2 within about 1/(2 −7+4 ) = 2 3 trials. Our goal now is to to efficiently derive from such a pair many other pairs that are conforming to δ 2 , so that a search for three rounds can start after the second round, by using the notion of neutral bits again (cf. §3.3). Neutral bits can be identified easily for a fixed pair of messages, but if several neutral bits are complemented in parallel, then the resulting message pair may not conform anymore. A heuristic approach was introduced in [7] , using a maximal 2-neutral set. A 2-neutral set of bits is a subset of neutral bits, such that the message pair obtained by complementing any two bits of the subset in parallel also conform to the differential. The size of this set is denoted n. In general, finding a 2-neutral set is an NP-complete problemthe problem is equivalent to the Maximum Clique Problem from graph theory, but good heuristic algorithms for dense graphs exist, see e.g. [8] . In the case of Rumba, we compute the value n for different message pairs that conform to δ 2 and choose the pair with maximum n. We observe that about 1/2 of the 2 n message pairs (derived by flipping some of the n bits of the 2-neutral set) conform to the differential 5 . This probability p is significantly increased, if we complement at most n bits of the 2-neutral set, which results in a message space (not contradicting with the linearization) of size about p · n . At this point, a full collision for 3 rounds has a reduced theoretical complexity of 2 85−7 /p = 2 78 /p (of course, p should not be smaller than 2 −3 ). Since we will have p > 1 2 for a suitable choice of , the complexity gets reduced from 2 85 to less than 2 79 .
Experimental Results
We choose a random message of low weight, apply the linearization for the first round and repeat this about 2 3 times until the message pairs conforms to δ 2 . We compute then the 2-neutral set of this message pair. This protocol is repeated a few times to identify a message pair with large 2-neutral set:
-For F 0 , we find the pair of states (X 0 , X 0 ) of low weight, with 251 neutral bits and a 2-neutral set of size 147. If we flip a random subset of the 2-neutral bits, then the resulting message pair conforms to δ 2 with probability Pr = 0.52. -For F 2 , we find the pair of states (X 2 , X 2 ) of low weight, with 252 neutral bits and a 2-neutral set of size 146. If we flip a random subset of the 2-neutral bits, then the resulting message pair conforms to δ 2 with probability Pr = 0.41.
72696874 00000000 00040040 00000400 00008004 6d755264 000001fe 06021184 00000000 00800040 30326162 00000000 00000300 00000400 04000000 636f6c62     Given these pairs for 2 rounds, we perform a search in the 2-neutral set by flipping at most 10 bits (that gives a message space of about 2 50 ), to find pairs that conform to δ 3 . This step has a theoretical complexity of about 2 34 for
A Constants
Here are the constants for Salsa20 and ChaCha (function Round) and for Rumba (functions F 0 to F 3 ). 
B Probabilistic Neutral Bits
We present here the sets of probabilistic neutral bits (PNB's) used for our attacks on reduced-round Salsa20 and ChaCha.
PNB's for the attack on Salsa20/7:
